{
  "type": "edition",
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    "url": "https://www.bookquiver.com"
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  "formats": "Every page has two versions with the same data: JSON (the page address + .json) and markdown (the page address + .md). Append .json or .md to any `url` in this document.",
  "title": "Libertarian Accounts of Free Will",
  "subtitle": null,
  "url": "https://www.bookquiver.com/randolph-clarke/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will/9780195306422",
  "publisher": "Oxford University Press",
  "publisher_series": [],
  "translators": [],
  "medium": "paper",
  "duration_seconds": null,
  "narrators": [],
  "illustrators": [],
  "cover_artists": [],
  "isbn": "978-01-9530-642-2",
  "pages": 256,
  "published": "2006-02-01",
  "language": "en_US",
  "cover": "https://quivercdn.com/covers/oxford-university-press/randolph-clarke/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will_978-01-9530-642-2-1f236c2c.webp?v=2026-11-13%2004%3A46%3A18",
  "json": "https://www.bookquiver.com/randolph-clarke/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will/9780195306422.json",
  "markdown": "https://www.bookquiver.com/randolph-clarke/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will/9780195306422.md",
  "binding": "Softcover",
  "description": "This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.",
  "book": {
    "title": "Libertarian Accounts of Free Will",
    "slug": "libertarian-accounts-of-free-will",
    "url": "https://www.bookquiver.com/randolph-clarke/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will"
  },
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Randolph Clarke",
      "slug": "randolph-clarke",
      "url": "https://www.bookquiver.com/randolph-clarke"
    }
  ]
}
