- 2006
- year of publication
- 256
- pages
- English (United States)
- language
- Softcover
- cover
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN-13
- 978-01-9530-642-2
- EAN
- 9780195306422
- Publication date
- 2006-02-01
- Book
- Libertarian Accounts of Free Will · 1 edition
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
